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The ACIAR-managed project CS1/1996/013, Herbicide-resistant weeds 
of wheat in India and Australia: integrated management, was designed to 








a problem weed of 
the rice–wheat cropping system of north-western India. By 1993, the weed 
had developed resistance to isoproturon, a herbicide which had delivered 
effective weed control for 15 years.
 
       
 
The short-term solution, implemented before the ACIAR project 
commenced, involved identification and registration of a new set of 
herbicides. But these new herbicides were expensive. To ensure high 
adoption they needed to be combined with changes in wheat-growing 
techniques that would provide cost savings to help farmers pay for them. 
And to avoid the re-emergence of chemical resistance, they needed to be 
used sparingly as one element in a broader approach to weed management.
 
       
 
The project team used these circumstances to field-test and encourage 
adoption of zero tillage, a technology that agronomists had been 
advocating for many years, but which had failed to capture the interest of 
Indian farmers. 
 
       
 
Zero tillage has the potential to deliver big cost savings. In addition, it 
provides prospects for yield increases by allowing early sowing of wheat 
and avoiding soil degradation. Project research established that zero 
tillage also provided effective weed control with only a moderate reliance 




We calculate a gain to the Indian economy of around $1800 million in 
net present value terms over the next 30 years from the adoption of 




 infestation in the rice–wheat 




This leads to an extremely high ratio of benefits to project costs.
 
       
 
Zero tillage by itself is clearly a profitable technology. It does not need a 
weed problem to justify its introduction. Without the ACIAR project, zero 
tillage would have been introduced to the region, though somewhat later 
than what has occurred.
 
       
 
On the assumption that the ACIAR project has advanced the adoption 
profile of zero tillage by 3 years, we calculate gains that can be attributed 
to ACIAR’s role of $238 million in net present value terms over the next 
30 years. This gain has been achieved with total expenditures on the 
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The gradual liberalisation of the Indian economy initiated in 1995 has 
delivered a period of sustained economic growth, principally in the 
manufacturing and service sectors. This is imposing adjustment pressures 
on agriculture, which is finding it harder to compete with faster-growing 
sectors for resources.
Despite this progress, agriculture still accounts for around 25% of India’s 
gross domestic product. Some 75% of India’s population of over 1 billion 
people live in rural areas, with many dependent directly and indirectly on 
agriculture for their livelihoods.
A strongly performing agriculture sector remains critical to improving the 
living standards of India’s rural poor. With no more land available for 
cultivation, agricultural output growth must come through productivity 
improvements on existing land. Critically, these improvements must be 
achieved in an environmentally sustainable manner to ensure their longer-
term viability.
There are growing concerns about environmental sustainability in many 
parts of Indian agriculture. Soil degradation is a serious problem in India, 
with 57% of the land undergoing degradation (Singh and Kumar 2002). 
The area of degraded soils continues to expand and, in many areas, 
watertables are falling and water quality is declining.
Projects that assist with poverty alleviation through improving agricultural 
productivity in ways which conserve and enhance natural resources such 
as soils and water seem particularly appropriate at this stage of India’s 
economic development. The Australian Centre for International 
Agricultural Research (ACIAR) project CSI/1996/013 (Herbicide-
resistant weeds of wheat in India and Australia: integrated management) 
provides a shining example of this. 
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: a threat to agriculture 





 (littleseed canary grass) is a common weed of wheat–rice 
cropping systems in the north-western Indo-Gangetic Plains of India. The 
area of infestation is mostly contained in the states of Punjab and Haryana 
(Figure 1).
 




 infestation (source: http://www.jayceenet.com/mapindia.htm (accessed 
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These two states account for around 3 million hectares of wheat–rice 
cropping land out of India’s 10 million hectare wheat–rice cropping 




 infestation has been a longstanding management problem 
for farmers in these states. The weed problem dates back to the green 
revolution of the late 1960s, which saw the introduction of dwarf wheat 
varieties and the improved irrigation and fertiliser practices needed to 
maximise their yield potential. Untreated weed infestation can result in 
dramatic reductions in wheat yields (the weed does not germinate in the 
rice part of the rotation) through farmers being forced to harvest immature 
crops. Complete failure of the wheat crop can occur in extreme cases.
 
Chemical weed control and chemical resistance
 




 could be effectively controlled by 
farmers spraying the crop with isoproturon, a substituted urea herbicide 
first recommended in 1977–78 and widely used since the early 1980s. This 
herbicide gave excellent weed control for 15 years. But, after this long 
period of continuous and heavy spraying, accentuated by poor application 




to isoproturon was discovered by Malik and others in the 
early 1990s (Malik and Singh 1995). The development of chemical 
resistance led to big declines in wheat yields in some parts of Haryana and, 
to a lesser extent, Punjab—yield reductions of 30 to 80% were observed 
on individual properties. In Haryana, the percentage of farmers reporting 
satisfactory weed control with isoproturon fell from around 80% in 
1989–90 to 20% in 1992–93.
By 1993, between 0.8 and 1 million hectares of the wheat–rice rotation in 





The effects on yield at the aggregate state level in the years immediately 
after this were masked by a run of favourable weather conditions and also 
by the rapid uptake of a new and high-yielding dwarf wheat variety, PBW-
343 (which is more competitive against weeds than other varieties), over 
the same period (Table 1). Introduced in 1995, PBW-343 was adopted 
quickly and by 1999–2000 was being used on more than 4 million hectares 
in northern India.
In an effort to avoid massive income losses, some farmers in Haryana 
switched to growing sunflowers. Sunflower plantings increased from 
10,000 hectares in 1993 to 60,000 hectares in 1996. Sunflower yields are 
only one third that of wheat. Problems with seed availability and a rapid  
9
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yield decline ensured that the switch to sunflowers was not a profitable 






Table 1. Trends in wheat area, production and yield: Punjab and Haryana
 
The development of herbicide resistance in weeds through continued use 
of the same herbicide group as the sole method of weed control is well 
known, particularly among Australian weed scientists. Herbicide 
resistance has been confirmed in 22 different weed species in Australia 
(Gill 2002). But flexible production and control responses adopted in 
Australia have curtailed the adverse economic impact of this resistance. 
By contrast, Malik and Singh (1995) considered the evolution of 




 in the wheat–rice cropping 
system of north-west India to be ‘the most serious case of herbicide 
resistance in the world, resulting in total crop failure and heavy 
infestation’. Their research showed that many biotypes had become 
resistant to isoproturon, with resistant biotypes from Haryana requiring 
up to eleven times the pre-susceptible dose of isoproturon to achieve 
50% weed control.
 
New herbicides: a short-term solution
 
Indian weed scientists led by Dr Malik at Haryana Agricultural University 
(HAU) working in conjunction with chemical companies, quickly 
















1990–91 3.3 3.7 12.2 1.8 3.5 6.4
1991–92 3.2 3.8 12.3 1.8 3.6 6.5
1992–93 3.3 3.8 12.4 2.0 3.6 7.1
1993–94 3.3 4.0 13.3 2.0 3.6 7.2
1994–95 3.3 4.1 13.5 2.0 3.7 7.3
1995–96 3.2 3.9 12.5 2.0 3.7 7.3
1996–97 3.2 4.2 13.7 2.0 3.9 7.8
1997–98 3.3 3.9 12.8 2.1 3.7 7.5
1998–99 3.3 4.3 14.5 2.2 3.9 8.6
1999–00 3.4 4.7 15.9 2.3 4.2 9.6
2001–01 3.4 4.6 15.5
 









 IN THE INDIAN RICE–WHEAT BELT
 






















were recommended in 1997 and the recommendation on isoproturon was 
withdrawn. While the speedy release of these replacement herbicides once 




 infestation under control and restored 
yields to their previous level, this was recognised as a short-term and 




Inevitably, the continued use of new herbicides as the sole method of 




The new herbicides are expensive, which in turn will affect their rate 
of adoption, level of use and profitability of wheat growing.
–H erbicide costs increased from Rs450/ha (isoproturon) to 
Rs1500–1800/ha (new chemicals)—a fourfold increase.
–U se of the new chemicals is delivering a yield improvement of up 
to 1000 kg/ha over the yields with resistance to isoproturon. This 
is worth an additional Rs5000/ha in wheat income, a return of Rs3 
for each Rs1 spent on new chemicals. Despite this, many farmers 
were, at least initially, extremely reluctant to adopt the new 
chemicals.
It became apparent that a new paradigm for weed control was 
needed—one that would provide a sustainable, long-term control solution 
in a way that was commercially attractive to farmers. 
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3 The ACIAR project
 
The sequence of events which led to the ACIAR project is set out in Table 2.
 
Table 2. Key events leading to the ACIAR project
 
In retrospect, in terms of the solutions that have emerged, key aspects of 




the involvement of Australian weed scientists, with their extensive 




the involvement of the International Maize and Wheat Improvement 
Center (CIMMYT), with its long experience in researching zero 




the preparedness of ACIAR, CIMMYT, HAU and Punjab 





financial contributions made by AusAID.
Australian scientists are acknowledged leaders in herbicide resistance of 
weeds and in determining how best to respond to achieve long-term 
sustainable weed control. Sustainable responses are based around 
integrated packages. These combine herbicides with management systems 
that exploit a knowledge of weed ecology to reduce the seed bank and its 
ability to germinate. This total weed management approach minimises, 
but does not eliminate, the use of chemicals. The effective life of 
chemicals can be greatly extended and the reliance on herbicides greatly 
reduced as weed seed bank density is progressively reduced.
 
Date Event




 confirmed by R.K. Malik and colleagues
November 1993 International workshop (organised by R.K. Malik and colleagues on behalf of the Indian Society of 
Weed Science) to discuss the herbicide resistance issue
Key Australian weed scientists and other foreign experts attend
May 1994 Involvement of Haryana Agricultural University (HAU) and Punjab Agricultural University (PAU) 
together with support from the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) 
rice–wheat consortium for the Indo-Gangetic Plains
Project proposal submitted to ACIAR
July 1996 Research commenced under ACIAR project (one year ahead of funds)
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What the ACIAR project involved
 
The ACIAR project had a number of dimensions (Figure 2).
 




Earlier ACIAR-commissioned reviews concluded that the project has 


















An environmentally sustainable and highly profitable weed 
management system (centred on zero tillage combined with new 




A high rate of adoption of this system has been achieved through 




The Indian weed scientists involved now have an international 
reputation for their achievements and expertise in weed resistance 
management.
Identify and survey the nature and magnitude of resistance to Phalaris minor
Field studies to investigate:
• effectiveness of chemical alternatives to isoproturon
• effectiveness of various non-chemical methods of weed control (raised beds, 
alternative crops, inter-row cultivation, delayed sowing etc.)
Identify wheat genotypes with superior competitive ability against weeds 
(essentially an Australian component of the project)
Extend (via a farmer/private farm participatory approach) information on weed 
resistance management to Indian scientists, field workers, extension agents, 
farmers
Develop resistance management expertise in India through conduct of project in 
India and staff training in Australia and Mexico 
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 CONTROLLING PHALARIS MINOR IN THE INDIAN RICE–WHEAT BELT
  The project has made a start on evaluating the ability of different 
wheat genotypes to outcompete weeds, but this is very much ‘work in 
progress’. Delivering varieties with an enhanced ability to 
outcompete weeds remains a long-term objective.
The integrated approach to weed control that has emerged from the project 
and is now being widely adopted by farmers consists of four 
interconnected components (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Integrated package for Phalaris minor weed control
The new chemicals
Work on identifying and fast-track registering the new chemicals was 
essentially complete before the ACIAR project. The credit for this work 
belongs to HAU–PAU weed scientists working in cooperation with the 
chemical companies. The result is a range of highly effective (though high 
cost) new herbicides whose use, when combined with the agronomic 
components of the package developed later, can be reduced over time as 
the Phalaris minor seed bank becomes progressively smaller.
Zero tillage and closer spacing
The most spectacular achievement of the project has been to bring about 
the widespread adoption of zero tillage as a key component of the Phalaris 
Early sowing
New chemicals Zero tillage and
closer spacing
• Phalaris minor control
•Y ield premium
•C ost savings14   CONTROLLING PHALARIS MINOR IN THE INDIAN RICE–WHEAT BELT
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minor control package. Zero tillage involves placement of the seed into the 
soil using a seed drill without prior soil preparation.
The concept of zero-till agriculture has been around for a long time. Its 
potential benefits, in terms of reduced damage to soil structure and savings 
in cultivation costs, are well known to agricultural scientists. Achieving 
adoption, however, requires overcoming the longstanding farmer belief 
that more rather than less tillage yields better crops.
Zero-till technology was experimented with in north-western India in the 
1970s at PAU, but failed to interest farmers. In part this was due to the lack 
of suitable implementation equipment at the time. Zero tillage was also 
introduced into the rice–wheat system in Pakistan in 1983 by CIMMYT 
using a New Zealand seed drill. In both cases the motivation was not weed 
control. In fact, at the time, agronomists did not realise that zero tillage 
would reduce grassy weed emergence.
In the early 1990s, zero tillage was again on the agenda in the search for 
methods to overcome the Phalaris minor infestation problem. CIMMYT, 
with funding from the United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development (DFID), undertook a project on zero-till technologies. Drills 
were purchased from CIMMYT’s DFID project money and used as part of 
HAU’s work under Dr Malik for field trials with and by local farmers as 
part of the ACIAR project.
The hypothesis behind the use of zero tillage was that savings in land 
preparation costs could be used by farmers to fund the new expensive 
chemicals for Phalaris minor control following the demise of isoproturon. 
The trials demonstrated the link between zero tillage and reduced grassy 
weed emergence. There was much greater Phalaris minor control in zero-
till plots. By combining zero tillage with the new herbicides, it was 
demonstrated that Phalaris minor infestation could be almost eliminated 
after three to four years (Figure 4). The enhanced weed control and 
savings in cultivation costs were achieved with no reduction in wheat 
yields. In fact, yields increased as the weed problem diminished and wheat 
germination was improved. 
Less water was needed for the first irrigation through retention of the 
water in the soil from the previous rice crop. With zero tillage, the crop 
remains green after the first irrigation because the water runs quicker 
through the soil. By contrast, with conventional tillage, the crop is pale 
yellow after the first irrigation due to prolonged water stagnation. Water 
savings to farmers are estimated by Singh et al. (2002) at around 28% in 
the first irrigation, and crops exhibited less lodging.15
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Figure 4. Continued use of zero tillage rapidly reduces the Phalaris minor population (results for two permanent 
sites in Kaithal district) (data source: Malik et al. (2002), p. 13)
Under zero tillage, rice straw residue is incorporated into the soil while 
creating minimum disturbance. Soil physical, chemical and biological 
properties are improved. Increased carbon storage has beneficial 
agronomic effects quite apart from greenhouse gas considerations. Soil 
temperature is raised in the cooler part of the year and lowered in the hotter 
part, enhancing crop growth.
Zero tillage is now being rapidly adopted in rice–wheat cropping systems 
of north-western India (Figure 5). The ACIAR project, by providing 
funding and scientific support to HAU–PAU to support the work of Dr 
Malik’s group, together with the support of CIMMYT, played an 
important role in the field trial work which resulted in farmer acceptance 
and rapid adoption of zero-till technology.
The adoption of zero tillage has necessitated the development of a local 
manufacturing company of suitable direct drill equipment. Project 
personnel have played an active role in this. In India, there are currently 12 
recognised manufacturers of suitable drills and more than 3000 drills are 
currently being used. Production capacity should be able to supply the big 
increase in machines required over the next few years as adoption of zero 
tillage rapidly increases.
Project research has shown that modifying the zero-till drills to give closer 
spacing of the seed (to 15 cm rather than the 22.5 cm spacing on 
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Figure 5. Adoption of zero tillage has been spectacular in Haryana (data source: Malik et al. (2002))
Early sowing 
To maximise yields, wheat must be planted at the optimal time. Planting 
late reduces the efficiency of crop response to fertilisers and reduces 
yields. Under conventional tillage, there is a long turnaround between 
harvest of the rice crop and wheat planting through the time taken to do six 
to eight cultivations. Zero tillage has enabled farmers to sow wheat 
earlier—by up to two to three weeks. Experiments have shown a 
1–1.5%/day reduction in yield in Haryana for each day planting is delayed 
beyond early November (Figure 6). Singh and Kumar (2002) report yield 
losses of 30 kg/day/hectare through late planting of wheat in Haryana and 
Punjab.
Project expenditures
The project received funding from ACIAR and AusAID, from the 
University of Adelaide as commissioned organisation, from HAU and 
PAU as developing country partners, from the rice–wheat consortium 
(RWC) of CIMMYT, and from the Herbicide Resistance Action 
Committee. Estimates of funds spent, including in-kind contributions 
from each organisation, are shown in Table 3. Although the ACIAR 
project funding did not arrive until 1997–98, considerable work was done 
in the two years before this by HAU and PAU personnel, supported by the 
RWC of CIMMYT and by state government funds in India. Some of the 
figures in Table 3 are estimates. Only the ACIAR figures can be validated 
against records of what was actually spent.
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Figure 6. Early sowing means higher yields (1998–99 wheat crop, Haryana) (data source: Malik et al. (2002), 
p. 18)
Table 3 indicates around $1.1 million of expenditure in cash and in kind 
over the life of the project by the organisations involved (equivalent to 
$1.3 million in 2000–01 dollars). Further support, mainly in kind, was 
given by other organisations—such as Cornell University in the United 
States of America with assistance on herbicide application methods.


























Supplier 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 1999–2000
ACIAR-managed component 170,425 133,924 115,742
Commissioned organisation (University of Adelaide) 67,400a  67,400a 67,400 a
Developing country partner (HAU–PAU)b 31,360c 31,360c 31,360 a 31,360a 31,360a
RWC–CIMMYTd 90,000 50,000 53,200 60,000 60,000
Herbicide Resistance Action Committee 11,000 11,000
Total 132,360 92,360 322,385 292,684 274,502
a These are the amounts that these organisations agreed to contribute (in cash and in kind) at project commencement.
b HAU–PAU = Haryana Agricultural University– Punjab Agricultural University.
c The same level of contribution from state government funds is assumed for the two years before commencement of the ACIAR project.
d Estimate of cash and in-kind contribution based on discussions with Peter Hobbs of the rice–wheat consortium of the International Maize and Wheat 
Improvement Center (RWC–CIMMYT).18   CONTROLLING PHALARIS MINOR IN THE INDIAN RICE–WHEAT BELT
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4 Evaluating the economic gains
The ACIAR project was very much a team effort. Achievements were the 
outcome of collaborative research and extension by key personnel from 
HAU, PAU, CIMMYT and the University of Adelaide. ACIAR project 
funding was instrumental in ensuring this team had adequate resources to 
do the job. 
We first focus on the value of the economic gains from the project as a 
whole. How much credit ACIAR can take for these gains compared with 
the credit due to other contributors is a more difficult and perhaps less 
meaningful question, which we consider later.
We measure the benefits from the project relative to a baseline reflecting 
anticipated outcomes assuming no project. How we specify the baseline is 
thus critical. The difference between the baseline and the actual outcome 
represents the gain due to the achievements of the project (Figure 7).
Figure 7. Schematic representation of project gains to be measured
The baseline shows a deteriorating agricultural performance in the region 
in the early 1990s due to the emergence of herbicide resistance in Phalaris 
minor. There is a slight improvement in 1997 with the release of new 
chemicals, but adoption is initially poor because of their high cost. In 
addition, the area covered by chemical resistance continues to spread. By 
2007, agricultural performance is projected to decline even further as 
resistance to the new high-cost chemicals becomes apparent. The 
development of resistance is due to the new chemicals being used as the 








Gain due to project19
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The baseline recognises that the release of the new chemicals and the 
reversal of the yield losses due to Phalaris minor infestation following 
chemical resistance to isoproturon happened independently of the ACIAR 
project, though the project did contribute some support for their testing. 
But zero tillage is not part of the baseline. The adoption of zero tillage 
through demonstration trials undertaken as part of the search for an 
effective weed control package is viewed as a major achievement of the 
team which ACIAR project funds helped support.
The project line shows a rapid recovery in agricultural performance in the 
region commencing in year 1999–2000, the first year of uptake of zero 
tillage by farmers. Agricultural performance accelerates rapidly in the 
following years in line with the actual and projected uptake of zero tillage, 
closer spacing and early sowing.
The gap between the baseline and project line, appropriately valued, 
represents the economic contribution of the collaborative project. It is this 
gap that we measure.
Components of gains
The gap between the baseline and project line in Figure 7 can be 
partitioned into eight components of gains (Table 4). Not all these 
components can be quantified. We make the following assumptions.
a. Prevention of future decline in yield through re-emergence of herbicide 
resistance
We assume that, if not for the achievement of the project in designing an 
integrated approach to weed control that is only partially dependent on 
herbicides, the herbicide-resistance story of the early 1990s would repeat 
itself by 2007. We assume that: 
  by 2007, 50,000 hectares (Haryana plus Punjab) would have a serious 
Phalaris minor reinfestation;
  the area of serious infestation would escalate rapidly to peak at 1.16 
million hectares by 2014, by which time it would encompass 70% of 
the 1 million hectares of wheat–rice cropping system in Haryana and 
20% of the 2.3 million hectares of wheat–rice cropping system in the 
Punjab (Table 5); and
  the average yield decline on infested land would be 1.35 t/ha.20   CONTROLLING PHALARIS MINOR IN THE INDIAN RICE–WHEAT BELT
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Table 4. Components of economic gains
b. Reduction in herbicide outlays
We assume that, relative to baseline, expenditure on the new herbicides 
will continue at the same rate for the first four years of zero tillage. This 
represents outlays of Rs1500 to Rs1800/ha. After the fourth year, we 
assume that average annual expenditures on herbicides can be reduced by 
Rs450/ha and still maintain effective weed control.
The expenditure saving only applies to the area sown with zero tillage. All 
areas that maintain conventional tillage will continue to incur the same 
herbicide outlays per hectare as in the baseline. We assume that the uptake 
in Haryana will be particularly rapid over the next few years driven by the 
big cost savings. Zero tillage uptake will peak at 920,000 ha in 2006–07, 
by which time 80% of the wheat–rice region of Haryana will have adopted 
it (Table 6). In Punjab, we have assumed a much lower uptake of zero 
Component Justification
Prevention of future decline in yield through 
re-emergence of herbicide resistance
Under the baseline, continued use of the new chemicals is likely to see 
herbicide resistance re-emerge on a serious scale within ten years (by 
2007). The yield declines experienced in the early 1990s will be repeated. 
By using these chemicals judicially as part of a long-term sustainable package 
with zero tillage, chemical resistance is unlikely to re-emerge.
Reduction in herbicide outlays Use of the new herbicides in the baseline must continue at the same cost 
per hectare each year (until chemical resistance renders the herbicides 
ineffective). But, by combining the new herbicides with the zero-till 
package, Phalaris minor seed banks are rapidly reduced to negligible levels 
after four years of zero tillage. Herbicide costs to achieve control can 
therefore be progressively reduced.
Reduction in tillage costs Conventional tillage involving six to eight workings is reduced to one 
working under zero tillage.
Avoidance of long-term yield decline through 
gradual degradation caused by conventional 
cultivation
Adoption of zero tillage will arrest and eventually reverse any long-term 
damage to soil structure and soil health through conventional cultivation 
methods. Achievement of environmental sustainability should deliver a 
small yield dividend. There will also be water savings, but these have no 
commercial value at present.
Yield premium through early sowing and 
closer spacing
With zero tillage providing opportunities for early sowing allowing more 
time for crop maturity, a yield premium of around 1% per day for seven to 
ten days is likely.
Capacity building/training The project has resulted in a greater capacity of Indian weed scientists to 
monitor and respond to future changes in the performance of the 
rice–wheat cropping system. Such changes, which may involve weed shifts 
and yield shifts, are inevitable.
Improved environmental outcomes Zero tillage will mean savings in greenhouse gas emissions and savings in 
water use.
Prospect of more weed-competitive varieties 
in the long term
The work on evaluating wheat genotypes for resistance to competition 
from weeds may lead to superior varieties over the longer term.21
 IMPACT ASSESSMENT SERIES
   CONTROLLING PHALARIS MINOR IN THE INDIAN RICE–WHEAT BELT
tillage with a peak adoption of only 120,000 ha by 2006–07. In Punjab, the 
incidence of Phalaris minor resistance to isoproturon was much lower 
than in Haryana and large areas appear to have remained unaffected. 
Isoproturon is still used in these areas. In addition, our assumptions 
recognise the much stronger mindset of Punjab farmers for a clean field 
(as delivered by conventional cultivation) before sowing.
Table 5. Assumptions about the area affected by re-emergence of herbicide resistance
These projections of zero tillage uptake are, by nature, speculative. They 
may well, however, prove pessimistic, particularly in the Punjab in view 
of the big cost savings available. In addition, they do not take into account 
adoption in states other than Haryana and Punjab. In South Bihar and Uttar 
Pradesh, for example, there are large areas of rice–wheat that may well 
adopt zero tillage in the light of the demonstration effect from the ACIAR 
project. But adoption in areas outside of Haryana and Punjab will be 
driven more by the contribution of zero tillage to profits rather than as an 
integrated weed control package. Malik et al. (2002, p. 20) consider that 
zero tillage is likely to have the greatest impact in the eastern part of India 
where sowing of wheat is invariably delayed. And adoption of zero tillage 
is proceeding in Pakistan in areas which have not had a Phalaris minor 
problem.
c. Reduction in tillage costs
A range of recent studies report cost savings from zero tillage on farms in 
Haryana (Nagaragan et al. 2002; Sharma et al. 2002a,b). In addition, 
comments by farmers participating in zero tillage trials with HAU 
agronomists—reported in Malik et al. (2002)—provide a rich source of 
information on their cost savings from zero tillage and their opinions of its 
value (Table 7). Estimates of cost savings vary from Rs1400 to Rs2500/ha. 
Diesel consumption is reduced by between 60 to 80 L/ha. Cost savings of 
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Rs2000/ha are assumed to be achieved on the projected area of zero tillage 
shown in Table 6.
Table 6. Reduction in expenditure on herbicides relative to baseline
d. Avoidance of long-term yield decline through adverse effects of 
conventional tillage
Singh and Kumar (2002) report significant economic losses from soil 
degradation in Haryana and Punjab (Rs3700 to Rs5400/ha). They estimate 
that degraded land represents 22% of the sown area of Haryana and 37% 
of Punjab.
Conventional cultivation methods in the rice–wheat belt are particularly 
hard on soil structure. Effects, in terms of reduced crop yields, are hard to 
isolate because of the very gradual impact over a long term and the 
numerous other more visible influences on yield from year to year. 
Deteriorating soil structure and fertility through conventional cultivation 
Year Area of zero tillage Reduction in herbicide 
expenditure
Yield premium (avoidance of long 
term yield decline)
Yield premium due 
to early sowing
(ha) (Rs) (ha) (kg/ha) (kg/ha)
1997 0 0 150
1998 2000 0 150
1999 8000 0 150
2000 40,000 0 150
2001 100,000 2000 ¥ 450 150
2002 180,000 8000 ¥ 450 150
2003 350,000 40,000 ¥ 450 150
2004 600,000 100,000 ¥ 450 150
2005 800,000 180,000 ¥ 450 150
2006 920,000 350,000 ¥ 450 150
2007 920,000 600,000 ¥ 450 2000 20 150
2008 920,000 800,000 ¥ 450 8000 20 150
2009 920,000 920,000 ¥ 450 40,000 20 150
2010 920,000 920,000 ¥ 450 100,000 20 150
2011 920,000 920,000 ¥ 450 180,000 20 150
2012 920,000 920,000 ¥ 450 350,000 20 150
2013 920,000 920,000 ¥ 450 600,000 20 150
2014 920,000 920,000 ¥ 450 800,000 20 150
2015–30 920,000 920,000 ¥ 450 920,000 20 150
Source: CIE estimates23
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is viewed as one reason for the levelling off of crop yield increases over 
time in north-western India.
Table 7. Farmer views on zero tillagea
Farmer Effects on weed 
germination
Cost savings (Rs/ha) Yield Other
1 Reduces germination 2000–2500
2 Significant Equivalent to conventional 
sowing
3 Reduces weed infestation Saves money and time
4 2000–2250 Increase of 750–1000 
kg/ha
Crop can be sown 9–10 
days earlier
5 Saves time, machinery and 
implements, and diesel
Higher yield
6 Improved weed control 
through full germination of 
wheat
2500 Yield increase
7 No germination Time saving Yield increase Less crust formation
8 Reduced germination  875 Yield increase Sowing can be done 5–7 
days earlier
9 Reduced germination 2000–2250 Yield increase of 
500–1000 kg/ha
Sowing possible 7–10 days 
earlier
10 Less Phalaris minor Significant Yield increase Reduced lodging, water 
savings
11 Improved weed control 
through faster and more 
conventional germination 
of wheat
1000 Yield increase of 700–800 
kg/ha
Sowing completed 5 days 
earlier. Faster germination 
and no crust formation




14 Has proven ‘more plough 
and more eat’ to be wrong
15 Saves time, reduces 
tractor maintenance, saves 
diesel
Water does not stagnate
16 Saves water, electricity, 
diesel, time
17 Less expenditure, time 200 kg/ha
18 Less expenditure Increase Early sowing
19 Decrease Saves labour, time and 
water
Increase
20 Reduced expenditure on 
diesel
Increase Reduced lodging
Continued on next page24   CONTROLLING PHALARIS MINOR IN THE INDIAN RICE–WHEAT BELT
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Table 7.  Farmer views on zero tillage (cont’d)
Farmer Effects on weed 
germination
Cost savings (Rs/ha) Yield Other
21 Saves diesel, time, tractor 
maintenance 
Reduced lodging
22 Better weed control Saves diesel Better due to early 
sowing
Excellent germination, less 
lodging
23 Controls weeds Saves time Helps maintain soil quality
24 Less germination 1500–1750 in diesel 500 kg/ha increase Crop remains green
25 Less germination Saves time, expenditure Higher Crop remains green
26 1250 in diesel 700–800 kg/ha increase Crop does not turn yellow 
after first irrigation
27 2000 200–300 kg/ha increase Crop remains green
28 1750 in ploughing costs 500–750 kg/ha increase No lodging, crop green 
and healthy
29 2000 No lodging, crop does not 
turn yellow
30 1000 in diesel 250–500 kg/ha increase Water does not stagnate 
and crop does not lodge
31 1250 in diesel 500–750 kg/ha increase No lodging and no 
yellowing
32 1250 in ploughing 500–750 kg/ha increase No lodging and no 
yellowing
33 Less Phalaris minor 1250 in ploughing Increase Crop does not lodge, 
earheads long and thick
34 Reduced weeds Less time and money Increase Reduced lodging
35 Saves time 800–1000 kg/ha Crop not damaged after 
first irrigation
36 Less Phalaris minor 1500–1750 in ploughing 
costs
500–750 kg/ha Water does not stagnate 
and crop does not turn 
yellow
37 Less germination 1750 in ploughing costs Increase
38 Reduced Phalaris minor 2000 in ploughing costs Increase More water infiltration 
and crop remains green
39 1000–1350 in diesel DAPb placement better
40 2000–2250 Increase Crop remains green
41 1750–2000 Increase Crop remains green
42 Less Phalaris minor 1250 Increase Reduced lodging and 
increased infiltration
43 1500–1750 500–1750 kg/ha Water does not stagnate, 
crop does not yellow
44 Less germination Saves labour, time Increase
45 Less germination 1000 in ploughing Increase Sowing completed five 
days earlier
Continued on next page25
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We assume that as a result of the adoption of zero tillage, a small yield 
dividend of 20 kg/ha relative to baseline (around 0.5% of current yields) 
will be apparent after ten years of zero tillage and will continue through to 
2030.
e. Yield premium through early sowing and closer spacing
With the adoption of zero tillage, the time taken between rice harvest and 
wheat sowing can be shortened considerably. Singh and Kumar (2002) 
estimate that late planting of wheat occurs on 20% of the rice area in 
Punjab and 40% in Haryana, which reduces the wheat yield by 
30 kg/ha/day. Other estimates are that yield increases of 1% per day for 
up to seven to ten days are achievable through early sowing. We assume a 
yield increase relative to baseline on the area of land sown with zero 
tillage equipment (at 15 cm rather than the conventional 22.5 cm spacing) 
of 150 kg/ha.
Table 7.  Farmer views on zero tillage (cont’d)
Farmer Effects on weed 
germination
Cost savings Rs/ha) Yield Other
46 Good control Saves money Increase
47 Reduced weeds 3000 Increase
48 Saves time 700 kg/ha increase
49 Saves time and water Excellent
50 Reduced germination Saves time, money Increase Easier irrigation
51 Less germination Saves time, diesel, water
52 Saves time, water cost
53 Reduced germination 2500
54 Increase Less loading
55 1750 Correct placement of 
DAPb
56 2250
57 Saves diesel, time
58 2250–500 Land remains levelled
59 2500 Increase Early sowing, no crust 
formation, less water at 
first irrigation
60 Less germination 2500
61 Saves time, diesel
aThese are the views of 61 innovative farmers collaborating with university scientists in zero-till trials. 
bDAP = di-ammonium phosphate, a fertiliser.
Data source: Malik et al. (2002).26   CONTROLLING PHALARIS MINOR IN THE INDIAN RICE–WHEAT BELT
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f. Capacity building/training
An important outcome of the project has been training and capacity 
building. Eight Indian weed scientists have received training at the 
University of Adelaide and CIMMYT. Indian weed scientists, through 
their collaboration with Australian and other experts, are now better 
equipped to put together holistic solutions (which extend well beyond the 
conventional heavy reliance on herbicides) to future weed management 
problems. This should assist in avoiding future sustained losses from weed 
infestation. We do not compute a value to the capacity building and 
training components, though acknowledge that this value may well be 
significant.
g. Improved environmental outcomes
In addition to the yield dividend likely from a reversal of the slow 
degradation of soils under conventional tillage, zero tillage is also likely to 
deliver several other environmental benefits. The reduction in diesel 
consumption of 60 to 80 L/ha represents a reduction of 0.25 t of carbon 
dioxide emissions into the atmosphere. There may also be gains through 
less carbon oxidation during cultivation and perhaps some carbon 
sequestration through incorporation of residue into the soil, though these 
gains have not yet been quantified. A reduction in atmospheric carbon 
dioxide emissions may have long-term environmental benefits. It may also 
be commercially valuable in the event that a carbon tax or emissions 
trading system is implemented on a global scale. But at this stage of global 
greenhouse gas policy development it has zero commercial value.
Another potential environmental and commercial benefit comes from the 
saving in water use under zero tillage at the first irrigation. This saving 
could be as high as 5% per year. Water is not currently priced to farmers so 
the savings from lower water use are not a commercial consideration. But 
this situation could change, especially if the watertable keeps on falling.
We have not included any financial benefit for the improved 
environmental outcomes likely from reduced carbon dioxide emissions 
and reduced water use.
h. Prospect of more weed-competitive varieties in the long term
The ACIAR project has made an important start to evaluating the 
competitive ability of wheat cultivars against grassy weeds. This 
knowledge, may in the longer term, lead to the release of improved 
varieties for farmers. At this stage, development of more weed-27
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competitive cultivars remains work in progress. We do not incorporate any 
gains into the analysis.
Projection horizon
A feature of the solution package to the Phalaris minor infestation 
problem is its long-term sustainability. There is no reason why the gains 
should not persist well into the future. We assume a pay-off horizon of 30 
years commencing in 1999–2000. Because of the discount rate (a 5% rate 
is used), pay-offs beyond this period have only a small present value.
Gains to India and gains to Australia
A requirement of ACIAR project evaluations is that the economic gains be 
computed for both the country collaborator (India) and for Australia. For 
this project, all economic gains in the short term accrue to India. 
Over the longer term, the work on evaluating the ability of different wheat 
genotypes to out-compete weeds may yield benefits to wheat growers in 
Australia as well as in India. 
Valuing the gains
The gains specified above are in terms of cost savings and yield increases. 
These gains need to be valued at so-called shadow prices—the prices that 
would operate in the absence of subsidies—rather than the actual or 
subsidised prices in the Indian economy.
The Indian government runs a farm support price (procurement price) 
system for wheat and many other commodities. High procurement prices 
and favourable growing seasons in recent years have encouraged a big 
increase in India’s wheat production—from 55.1 million tonnes in 
1990–91 to 78.6 million tonnes in 1999–2000. Large stocks of grain have 
accumulated—current grain stocks exceed 70 million tonnes, one third of 
which is wheat. India has turned from a net importer to a net exporter of 
wheat (Figure 8). Imports of wheat are subject to a tariff of 50%.
India is now exporting wheat on a significant scale. Because of real and 
perceived quality problems, India’s wheat exports are discounted relative 
to ruling free on board (f.o.b.) prices. The discount over the 1990s ranged 
from 3 to 34% (Chand and Jha 2001, p. 45). According to United States 
Department of Agriculture estimates, the Indian government in mid-2001 28   CONTROLLING PHALARIS MINOR IN THE INDIAN RICE–WHEAT BELT
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was offering wheat to government trading houses, contingent on it being 
exported at less than two thirds the price of procurement, which amounts 
to a subsidy of US$32/t. This in turn has drawn complaints from World 
Trade Organization member countries. Australia, as a major exporter of 
wheat, has lost sales in the Asian region to subsidised Indian wheat 
exports.
Figure 8. Indian wheat trade (data source: United States Department of Agriculture statistics)
The current procurement price of wheat to farmers is Rs6100/t. This 
compares with an f.o.b. export price for US no. 2 hard red winter wheat 
(Gulf) (considered by Indian economists to be the appropriate indicator 
price) of around US$130/t. After allowing for a 20% discount to the world 
price and taking into account transport costs from the farm to the wharf, 
we consider the economic price of Indian wheat to be around Rs4800/t.
India also provides input subsidies to agricultural and other activities. In 
wheat growing, the main subsidies are on fertilisers, electricity and canal 
irrigation. Rates of subsidy peaked in the mid-1990s, but are now 
declining as governments seek to reduce the financial burden. The input 
subsidy story for Indian agriculture is a complex one. Acharya (2001, p. 
195) argues that the subsidies are, to some extent, there to overcome 
inefficiencies (implicit taxes) on input-supplying industries. For 
example, a large proportion of the fertiliser subsidy goes to the fertiliser 
industry and its feedstock-supplying agencies, and electricity subsidies 
compensate for inefficient transmission and distribution systems in 
state-owned electricity enterprises. And for canal irrigation projects, 
costs are inflated by bad design and arrangement. For these reasons, 
actual subsidies accruing to farmers are believed to be much lower than 
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Production response
Indian farmers can be expected to respond to the improvement in their 
profitability from the cost reductions and yield increases associated with 
zero tillage, closer spacing and earlier sowing. Chand and Jha (2001, 
p. 73) report a supply elasticity of 0.43 for Indian wheat farmers 
nationwide. The elasticity for farmers operating in a rice–wheat rotation in 
these circumstances is likely to be a lot lower than this. Our analysis 
incorporates a significant production response through the rapid adoption 
profile for zero tillage. An additional response might be expected through 
farmers intensifying their use of inputs, particularly fertiliser. But wheat 
growers in the region have already reached sharply diminishing returns to 
further intensification with conventional inputs (Prabhu and Heisey 2001). 
For this reason, we use a low supply elasticity of 0.1.
Distribution of gains between producers and consumers 
in India
The production response to the reduction in unit costs and the yield 
increases will result in more wheat produced and higher profits for farmers 
adopting zero tillage. In an undistorted wheat pricing policy environment, 
some of the benefits could be expected to flow through to Indian wheat 
consumers as lower prices for wheat. But the policy environment is highly 
distorted through the procurement pricing system and by a complex set of 
government agency interventions in the domestic wheat market.
The Food Corporation of India (FCI), a government agency, purchases all 
wheat offered by producers at the minimum support price. The FCI runs a 
buffer stock scheme for wheat, partly motivated by concerns for food 
security, to ensure stable and affordable prices to consumers. This wheat is 
then sold to consumers under the public distribution scheme at so-called 
issue prices, which depend on whether the consumer is above or below the 
poverty line. Sales are heavily subsidised to low income consumers. 
Different prices are also set to different millers depending on location.
In this policy environment, the increased wheat supplies will not lead to a 
reduction in wheat prices to domestic consumers. Indian households will 
suffer a reduction in welfare through the need for the government to fund, 
through higher taxes or reduced outlays on other activities, a greater 
volume of subsidised wheat production. This consumer welfare loss needs 
to be taken into account to arrive at an estimate of the net benefit to the 
Indian economy from the project.30   CONTROLLING PHALARIS MINOR IN THE INDIAN RICE–WHEAT BELT
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Results
The profile of producer gains from each component is set out in Table 8. 
These gains are valued at world rather than domestic prices so they are net 
of the increase in consumer subsidies needed to support the additional 
wheat production.
Table 8. Components of producer benefits (A$m)a 
The largest component of benefits is the reduction in tillage costs followed 
by the yield premium from early sowing. Prevention of future yield 
declines by avoiding the re-emergence of chemical resistance involves a 
significant ‘first round’ benefit. But the yield declines would turn wheat 
growing from profit into loss necessitating a switch to other crops. Taking 
this switch into account reduces the ‘final round’ benefits from this 
component.
The present value of the future stream of benefits (valued at world prices) 
over a 30-year horizon comes to $1809 million in year 2000–01 in present 
value terms (Table 9). This is made up of $2678 million of producer 
















2000–01 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.0 0.0 3.2
2001–02 0.0 0.0 8.0 0.0 0.0 8.0
2002–03 0.0 0.1 14.4 0.0 0.0 14.5
2003–04 0.0 0.7 28.0 0.0 0.0 28.7
2004–05 0.0 1.8 48.0 0.0 0.0 49.8
2005–06 0.0 3.3 64.0 0.0 0.0 67.2
2006–07 0.0 6.3 73.5 0.0 0.0 79.9
2007–08 0.6 10.8 73.5 0.0 54.1 139.1
2008–09 1.2 14.5 73.5 0.0 54.1 143.3
2009–10 2.3 16.6 73.5 0.2 54.1 146.8
2010 4.6 16.6 73.5 0.4 54.1 149.3
2011 9.3 16.6 73.5 0.7 54.1 154.2
2012 10.4 16.6 73.5 1.3 54.1 156.0
2013 11.6 16.6 73.5 2.3 54.1 158.2
2014 13.4 16.6 73.5 3.1 54.1 160.8
2015–2030 13.4 16.6 73.5 3.5 54.1 161.2
aIncrease in gross margins at world prices. Hence is net of additional consumer subsidies to support the higher production.
Data source: CIE calculations.31
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benefits valued at domestic prices, less $869 million of additional 
consumer subsidies associated with the expanded wheat production.
Allocation of benefits between ACIAR and other 
contributors
The success of this project owes much to synergies and 
teamwork—contributed from individuals with different backgrounds and 
from different institutions, but with a common interest in the problem of 
herbicide resistance and how to overcome it. The initial (short-term) 
solution, the release of new chemicals, was derived independently of the 
ACIAR project. The key component of the longer-term solution (zero 
tillage) was also conceived and tested independently of the ACIAR project 
and involved many people from different organisations.
But, until the project, adoption of zero tillage was negligible. It was a great 
idea waiting for a trigger for it to be adopted. The high cost of the new 
chemicals provided that trigger. And the extensive trials of zero tillage 
conducted for farmers and by farmers, which were made possible by the 
ACIAR project support, proved critical to overcoming the scepticism of 
farmers to adoption.
For these reasons, the issue of how much of the gains are attributable to the 
ACIAR project is a difficult one to address. Each contributor clearly 
needed the other for eventual project success.
The component of gain represented by the avoidance of resistance to new 
herbicides can be clearly allocated to the ACIAR project, which brought 
Indian weed scientists in direct contact with the ideas and experiences 
behind the integrated approach to weed management used in Australia. 
But to achieve this gain requires the adoption of zero tillage.
Zero tillage is clearly a profitable technology by itself. It does not need a 
weed problem to justify its introduction. So it seems reasonable to assume 
that zero tillage would eventually have been introduced without the 
ACIAR project—though with a delay.
We assume that, without the ACIAR project, zero tillage would have been 
introduced to the region, but with the adoption profile lagged by three 
years. This assumption is consistent with the observation of zero tillage 
now starting to be adopted in other parts of the rice–wheat system in South 
Asia that have not had a Phalaris minor weed problem. On this basis, we 
calculate gains that can be attributed to ACIAR’s support role of 32   CONTROLLING PHALARIS MINOR IN THE INDIAN RICE–WHEAT BELT
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$238 million (Table 10). With the cost of the ACIAR-funded project 
amounting to only $1.3 million (in 2000–01 dollars), this yields a 
benefit–cost ratio of around 180:1. The sensitivity analysis in Table 10 
shows that these gains would be much higher if the ACIAR projects 
effects were to advance the adoption profile of zero tillage by more than 
three years.
Table 9. Summary of benefits and costs (net present valuea to 2030)
While the results of the assessment are clearly sensitive to assumptions on 
when zero tillage would have been adopted by farmers without the ACIAR 
project, the key point is that ACIAR has played a vital role in a very 
successful project.
Table 10. Net benefits from the ACIAR-managed contribution to the project (net present value, A$m)
What if the benefits do not last for 30 years?
The cost–benefit analysis has assumed that the benefits from the adoption 
of zero tillage will continue undiminished for 30 years. Zero tillage has 
now been implemented for four years on some farms in Haryana and there 
is no evidence of any emerging problems. In fact, the benefits appear to be 
getting larger as the number of years it has been used increases. 
Producer benefitsb Net present value
(A$m) (%)
Prevention of future decline in yield through re-emergence of herbicide resistance 103 5.7
Reduction in herbicide outlays 175 9.7
Reduction in tillage costs 950 52.5
Avoidance of long-term yield decline through degradation 24 1.3
Yield premium due to early sowing and closer spacing 557 30.8
Total producer benefit (world prices) 1809 100.0
Net gain to India 1809
a Discount rate of 5%. 
b Increase in gross margin valued at world prices.
Data source: CIE calculations.
Adoption of zero tillage advanced by
3 years 5 years 8 years
Net gain to India (ACIAR-managed contribution) 238 453 739
ACIAR-managed contribution to project expenditure  1.3 1.3 1.3
Source: CIE calculations.33
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Nevertheless, there is some probability that problems unforeseen now will 
arise with its continued use. This could include, for example, the 
emergence of another weed species as a significant problem. Table 11 
attempts to account for this prospect by calculating benefits over a shorter 
payback period than 30 years. The table indicates that, even if the benefits 
are assumed to accrue for only ten years, the ACIAR project would still 
generate an extremely high ratio of benefits to costs. The ACIAR 
contribution, in terms of advancing the adoption of zero tillage by three 
years, does not change significantly.
Table 11. Comparing benefits for a range of payback periods (net present value, A$m)
Impact on poverty alleviation
About 36% of the Indian population live below the official poverty line 
(set by the Indian government). Punjab and Haryana are states with a 
relatively high average per capita income (around US$600 per capita for 
Punjab and US$550 per capita for Haryana) compared with the average for 
all India of US$400 per capita. But these averages conceal large numbers 
living in poverty.
The analysis in Table 8 showed that, once adoption of zero tillage reaches 
its maximum level, farmers in Haryana and Punjab will gain an extra $160 
million/year in farm profits on wheat plantings covering 920,000 
hectares—a gain of $174/ha/year. For a family cropping 5 hectares of 
wheat, this would amount to additional family income of $870/year, a 
significant increase over the state averages. The contribution of the project 
to poverty alleviation among poor farmers and farm workers in the region 
may well be substantial. Further work is needed to establish the project’s 







Net gain to India 1809 1340 584
Net gain to India from ACIAR 
contribution
238 238 223
Source: CIE calculations.34   CONTROLLING PHALARIS MINOR IN THE INDIAN RICE–WHEAT BELT
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